By Dylan Vernon, TIME COME #23, 28 July 2025,
The current national debate on the Belize Constitution (Thirteenth Amendment) Bill reminded me of a TIME COME piece from a year ago. I argued then that: “Over the past two decades we have seen the increased use of periods of public emergency outside of civil protests and natural or health disasters. More recently, these are invariably directed at quelling gang-related criminal activity in particular high risk geographical areas. This increasingly frequent ‘duro mano’ resort to periods of public emergency by governments of both major parties is a public admission of our collective failure over time to effectively address the worsening situation of criminal activity since independence. This failure of leadership and of policy is systemic.” It is but one of the ‘truths’ that has to be accepted if we are to rationally assess the Thirteenth Amendment) Bill.
On Truths
The constitutional tool of declaring short-term public emergencies is not, in itself, bad or good. All states have this tool. Each state decides how to trigger this power, how it is to be limited, how implementation happens, how human rights are protected, and importantly, how it fits into a bigger project of addressing ‘the’ problem. There is nothing wrong with re-thinking how we approach this tool of state. Yet, because it affects human rights and can be abused, we must do so with extreme care and with informed, objective and dispassionate analysis.
Belize has yet to comprehensively and consistently address the known central drivers of our crime and gang violence problems: growing inequality, poverty, inadequate social welfare, stagnant living standards for many, partisan opportunism, lack of visionary leadership and weak national policies. Over time, direct intervention and rehabilitation programmes have also proven to be sporadic, under-resourced and not sufficiently effective.
There are also ever present international and regional drivers (drug trafficking, money laundering, for example), as well as colonial legacies of violence (see Frantz Fanon) and those that negatively affect our ability to address chronic criminality (for example, an ineffective colonial political system). These are matters that require long-term and transformational approaches to mitigate. But it is also true that after almost 44 years of independence, we could have made ourselves more resilient to the international drivers and done much better at decolonising our institutions.
That said, Belizeans female and male, rich or poor, from every district, of every age, every ethnicity, every religion or none, every gender, every sexual orientation, have long been frustrated about the on-going failure to address criminality, violence, and threats to personal safety. This truth is very real, always present, and like most societal woes, felt most by poorer and more vulnerable Belizeans.
Belizeans, by now, know the truth that burglar bars, iron gates, security cameras, guns, machetes and black belts in karate cannot fully protect us. Nor can they decrease criminal behaviour in the long-term. But they can provide some peace of mind for the present. Public emergencies, that target gang activity in specific areas, can be added to this list. The key difference is that public emergencies are constitutional decisions of state, not personal acts.
On Legacy
Sections 18 and 19 of the Independence Constitution of Belize that deal with public emergencies have origins that pre-date the constitutional making process in 1981. From the time of crown colony status in 1871 to self-government in 1964, the power to declare state of emergencies was the most critical and non-negotiable power of the British colonial authorities. It was used by the British to squash the people’s fight for equality and freedom and to perpetuate exploitation of Belize for a bit longer. There are many examples in our political history, but the point is that we should never forget the lesson that the tool of public emergencies can be used for evil.
The White Paper on the Independence Constitution of Belize contained four short paragraphs (6-9) on public emergencies – the essence of which was also in the self-government constitution of 1963. V.H. Courtenay was to reveal at the London Constitutional Conference in April 1981 that these sections were also informed by the Jamaica Constitution. During the brief public consultations on the White Paper in Belize, there were notable comments on proposals on public emergencies – mostly about limiting the power of the state.
Indeed, one of the few amendments made to the White Paper by the Joint Select Committee came from the public: to include the necessity to secure a two-thirds majority of the House of Representatives when it declared a public emergency. That is where the current ‘two-thirds’ concept came from.
At the London Conference, the issue of public emergencies got a good share of attention, mostly from the British side, in the Seventh and Seventeenth plenary sessions. It was in London that it was agreed to reduce the period for which the House could declare a state of emergency from six months (in the White Paper) to two months, with the option of extensions. It was also agreed, at the urging of the British, that in terms of human rights during public emergencies, that no derogation be made from provisions protecting the right to life, the prohibition of torture, and freedom of conscience. This is why today our Constitution at Section 18(10), excludes these three from the list of human rights which the state can suspend without contravening the Constitution.
The fact that these exclusions did not come from the Belize side may be related to the irony that as the Belize delegation negotiated the sections on public emergencies with the British in London in April 1981, Belize was under its last pre-independence state of emergency. Declared by Governor Hennessy and supported by the People’s United Party (PUP) government, the purpose was to quell civil unrest over the Heads of Agreement (the last pre-independence attempt to resolve Guatemalan claim) and over the timing of independence. Today in 2025, and in the context of changing times, the 13th Amendment Bill forces us to revisit our use of public emergencies once again.
One other lesson from the legacy of 1981 is that the framers of the Constitution understood that the use of public emergencies was so formidable a power that amending the relevant sections was made to require approval by three-fourths of the members of the House and the majority of the Senate – in other words the Senate must concur and cannot be overruled by the House.
On Process
Coming so shortly after the March 2025 general election and before a review of the Report of the People’s Constitution Commission (PCC), it is clear that the government is very serious about the Thirteenth (13th) Amendment Bill. And I give my government the benefit of the doubt that the proposals are intended to address a part of the problem of citizen insecurity we face as Belizeans. But before addressing the specifics of these proposals, I will share some insights on approach and process. My view is that, in terms of process, the 13th Amendment Bill falls short on three key measures.
First, it disappoints on providing informed justification. There was no warning of the proposals, no manifesto promise, no prior explanation of their rationale. It appears that very little evidence-based research and analysis informed this Bill. For example, apart from some very basic numbers in terms of some crime statistics, has there been any comprehensive analysis of the 18 public emergencies referenced in the Bill? How does one measure their effectiveness for addressing gang violence? How does one justify their further use? This would have been an excellent opportunity to use the ‘white paper’ approach: providing background information on the proposals and testing them with the public prior to putting a Bill to the House.
Second, it disappoints on informed public consultation and public education. This is no surprise considering our top-down legislative history. However, given the deep and broad nature of Belize’s citizen insecurity problem, the process deserved a well-designed and comprehensive consultation process. Instead, I observe an ad hoc and reactive element to the few consultations so far. And what of the public consultations done by the PCC? Some say that these resulted in several recommendations to amend the sections in the Constitution on public emergencies. What of these?
Third, it disappoints in that it is proposed ‘alone’ and outside of a wider and long-term vision and plan by government for the society to address citizen insecurity. If the 13th Amendment Bill were presented as one immediate measure to be taken in concert with a comprehensive raft of short-term, medium-term and longer-term actions over a fixed period of time, it would have signalled maturing state leadership. It could have been called something like a ‘special period for citizen security’ in which all stakeholders in Belizean society cooperate to regain control of the security problem. This is not idealism. It is what should be normal in a representative democracy.
On Time
I contend that it is not too late to fix these three shortcomings of process. But, given the arguments made above, they cannot be adequately addressed in 90 days – unless we want the usual band-aid approach that facilitates short-term fixes and partisan bickering. The nation needs more time, especially given the magnitude of the problem.
On a positive note, the quality of the debate and arguments for and against the 13th Amendment made, for example, by the Belize Network of NGOs (BNN), the Association of Defence Attorneys (ADA), lawyers, the media, individuals and political parties has been encouraging. It exposes that there is a national willingness to take a deeper dive and to engage in an all-of-society approach on this one.
My first call, then, is for government to use its super legislative majority to ‘extend’ the real debate that it has triggered on ‘what we do’ about how gang violence and wider criminality have worsened our security as Belizeans. Let’s think some more before we act. Let’s not make 90 days an artificial deadline – as I suspect some of the proponents appear to be pushing.
According to Section 69 (5) of the Constitution, Sections 18-19 on public emergencies are among those for which any Bill to alter the Constitution “shall not be submitted to the Governeor-General for [her] assent unless there has been an interval of not less than ninety days” between the first and second readings in the House. In short, it can be more than 90 days if government delays the second reading. It should!
This will allow for the design of “full public consultations, legal review and transparent reform process” called for by BNN. The BNN is right on target with this.
On Content
All that said, the 13th Amendment Bill deserves a sober review – even as I hope that the government will wheel and come again. Some of the proposals do provide food for thought and there have been noteworthy and informative reviews by others. I will share my own considered ‘two cents’ on the proposed amendments in a Part II TIME COME post. And, like others, I will be writing to the House Committee as well – even as I hope that the current deadline for submission (26 August 2025) does not stand.
I will sign off Part I with a nagging question about one of the justifications provided in the Bill. This is that two recent High Courts hearings, on the claims of individuals of the violation of their rights, yielded two divergent opinions. The government argues that this creates legal uncertainty that needs to be addressed. But we have a constitutional judicial process of appeals to the Court of Appeal and, thereafter, to the Caribbean Court of Justice that is set up to resolve such legal uncertainty. Why not go this route? If the High Court judgment that found that the state overreached is determined, on appeal, to be right, it would mean that others could attempt a similar claim. As proposed, wouldn’t the enactment of the 13th Amendment Bill take away the rights of these others?
Constitutional amendments should strengthen, not weaken, the provisions that protect the human rights of all Belizeans. This is one of the key principles I will use for my own assessment of the content of the Bill in my next TIME COME.
For now, I repeat that the process of presenting and engaging on the Thirteenth Amendment Bill has unnecessary flaws that can still be fixed. Let’s do it right and help trigger a new chapter of more meaningful people’s participation in the making of national legislation and policy.
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