By Dylan Vernon, TIME COME #10, 8 August 2024.

For this TIME COME, I share the keynote speech (without the ad libbing) I had the pleasure of delivering to the 102^nd Annual General Meeting of the Public Service Union of Belize on 2 August 2024 in Belize City. The AGM’s theme was “PSU: 102 Years Strong! United in Service, Legacy in Action.”

Congratulations on the 102^nd anniversary of your Public Service Union. There is much in your PSU legacy to be proud of but also more legacy to create. I have been asked by your Council of Management to share some thoughts on key issues of political reform in Belize today. Whenever we use the word reform it is usually because something needs fixing. In this case it is our very democracy.  I opted to build my remarks tonight around an issue I know that your union has often highlighted: the blatant failure of Belize to deliver constitutionally mandated annual audits of public accounts in most of the past 12 years. However, I propose to approach this ‘audit problem’ from a rather different and wider angle than what you may be used to.

On the PSU Legacy

Before I get to that, let me share some bits and pieces of your PSU legacy as it relates to Belize’s post-1950s constitutional history:

• In 1963, the then Public Officers Union was one of very few organisations to submit proposals on the self-government constitution. These included a call for a section on human rights to be added.
• During the very short public consultation process to develop the 1981 Constitution, the PSU proposed substantive changes to the White Paper on the Constitution. You called, for example, for strengthening provisions on labour rights
• Notably, your union then was opened to the progressive idea of Belize becoming a republic with an appointed President replacing the GG at independence.
• The PSU was also prominent among those organisations that called for the 1981 consultations to be extended and for a full draft constitution to be shared for public debate. The British and the then PUP government agreed to none of these.
• The PSU then demanded to be represented at the Constitutional Talks in London in April 1981. While this too was rejected, the PSU still travelled to London on its own to meet the British press and British officials to share its views on the new constitution.
• In the 1990s, your union joined the SPEAR-led campaign for political reform, which culminated in the first ever People’s Manifesto: Century 21 before the 1998 election.
• Thereafter in 1999, your union was represented on the resulting Political Reform Commission – a historical civil society victory.
• And you know that, apart from PSU’s advocacy for constitutional reform over the past two decades, you now sit on the People’s Constitution Commission.

So yes, the PSU does have some legacy of advocacy on constitutional reform to celebrate, to learn from and to build on.

Audit Woes: Throwing Darts

But now on to a legacy in the making that we cannot celebrate: that of Belize not delivering constitutionally required annual audit reports recently. I put it to you that Belize’s dismal record to prepare, table, debate and/or publish audit reports for over ten years is a critical symptom of governance and constitutional decay in Belize. Let us recall what should be legally done according to the Constitution (Sections 109 and 120) and the Finance and Audit (Reform) Act (Sections 12-13).

You know the drill. The Accountant General is to send annual accounts of public funds to the Auditor General three months after the end of the financial years. The Auditor General is constitutionally required to submit an annual audit of public accounts to the National Assembly via the minister of finance within three months after receiving these accounts. By practice, the minister would share this with cabinet. Then, the said minister is constitutionally required to table this in the House — after which it is sent to the Joint Public Accounts Select (chaired by the Opposition) prior to debate in the House.

If no annual audit is laid before the House, the Clerk of the National assembly is constitutionally required to inform the Auditor General who should “promptly” submit copies to the Clerk to lay before the House. If no audit is presented after all this, the Senate has the power to summon the Auditor General, report the findings to the Prime Minister (who appoints auditor generals) and the Senate can recommend removal of the person holding the post. This Senate has never used its authority related to the annual audit.

So, why the dismal recent record? I contend that in answering this question we have focused too much on the smoke, and too little on what fuels the flames. The tangled net of blame on the ‘audit problem’ has been cast very wide. It’s like throwing darts and seeing what sticks. We don’t have time to waste tonight, so let us agree to set aside the pathetic game of the two major parties just blaming each other.

Over the past decade, we have heard that the ‘audit problem’ is because of one or more of the following:

• Failure of the Accountant General to provide annual accounts to the Auditor General.
• Lack of capable leadership from auditor generals.
• Lack skilled and/or committed public officers.
• Lack of financial resources and adequate compensation.
• Elected and public officials having corruption to hide.
• Failure of the minister of finance to table audits.
• Failure of clerks of the National Assembly to sound the alarm that annual reports are not submitted.
• Failure of the House to debate and then publicize reports.
• Failure of the Joint Public Accounts Committee to review the reports.
• Failure of the Senate to take constitutional action.
• There is no critical mass of people advocating for audit accountability.

If all these eleven are true, then some blame lies with nearly all of us! With public officers, account generals, auditor generals, ministers of finance, cabinet ministers, clerks of the National Assembly, members of the National Assembly of both major political parties, House committees and with the people.

A Deeper ‘Systems Problem’

I contend that this list, by its very scope, exposes a deeper systemic malfunction: that a core culprit of the audit problem is the ever-deepening fusion of the powers of the Executive and the Legislature.  Let’s dissect this legacy of colonialism a bit.

We know that Westminster parliamentary democracy is premised on the doctrine of the separation of the powers of the three branches of government.  The separation of the Executive and Legislature is assumed, even as some over overlap is allowed. Importantly, our Constitution says that, as the collective representative of the people, the National Assembly develops laws and policies for the nation and to oversee the Executive. Under the leadership of a powerful prime minister, the authority to execute laws and policies lies with Cabinet – which is at the apex of the Executive and its public service.  As such, the Executive is collectively responsible to the National Assembly to ensure that it does not overstep or abuse its legal authority.

Systemic Misfit

In the birthplace of the Westminster parliamentary model, the House of Commons of the United Kingdom has 650 representatives. This allows prime ministers of majority parties to easily select a cabinet of 20 ministers – without any prospect that ministers of cabinet and ministers of state can be the majority in parliament. And there are enough numbers so that there is always a strong backbench. In Belize, our small parliaments complicate the application of the principle of separation of powers and makes a mockery of the concept of backbenchers. This problem of systemic misfit has worsened since independence.

I put it to you that this lack of timely and quality annual audit reporting to the National Assembly is a defining symptom of this systemic misfit. In a recent article in TIME COME, I dubbed this the ‘Cal Dilemma’. During the 1981 public consultations on the independence constitution, Dr Angel Cal wrote to the Joint Select Committee on the White Paper stating:

If Cabinet is collectively responsible to the National Assembly, [when] Cabinet members have a majority over non-Cabinet members in the National Assembly, it would be difficult to demand “responsibility” from the Cabinet. The number of Cabinet members should therefore be limited to a number where the majority would be non-Cabinet members. Only then will the Cabinet be “responsible” to the National Assembly.

In the 43 years since 1981, the ‘Cal Dilemma’ has not been adequately addressed by the political directorates of both mass parties. This is true even considering the constitutional amendment made by the PUP government in 2001 that (a) no more than two-thirds of the members of the majority party in the House of Representatives can be appointed to Cabinet and (b) no more than four senators can be appointed to Cabinet. (Section 40).

What’s the Problem?

Even with the ‘two-thirds rule’, parties in power can ensure that enough of their elected representatives are appointed as ministers and ministers of state to be the majority in the House. For example, in 2012, the then United Democratic Party (UDP) government had a slim majority of 17 of the 31 seats in the House. Then Prime Minister Dean Barrow appointed two-thirds or 11 UDP members as ministers and six as ministers of state. As such, all 17 legislators became a part of the Executive. A total fusion of legislative and executive powers!

What if the winning party gets a supermajority of 26 of the 31 seats as the current People’s United Party (PUP) government did in 2020? Of the 26 PUP representatives in the House, 16 were appointed ministers and (eventually) 10 as ministers of state by current Prime Minister John Briceño. All 26 became a part of the Executive. (There is now 25 due to the bye-election in Toledo East, but it is likely to go back to 26 soon). Again, a total fusion of powers!

And what of the 1988 constitutional amendment that ministers of state are not considered members of Cabinet? This very blunt provision allows as many ministers of state to be in Cabinet as the prime minister decides. And we know that prime ministers have increasingly assigned them ministerial portfolios and have them sit in Cabinet. Don’t be fooled by the smoke and mirrors. The fact is that ministers of state, like ministers, are part of the Executive. Technically, this executive role disqualifies them from being backbenchers.

So, what does all this have to do with the audit problem? In essence, the failure of separation of powers means that we have the possums guarding the chickens. And no one guarding the possums. Think about this. When there is total legislative and executive fusion:

• The very same individuals who constitutionally enact annual budgets also execute expenditure of these public funds.
• The very same individuals who constitutionally execute such expenditure are critical to ensuring that effective annual accounting and auditing take place.
• The very same individuals who are critical for audits to happen are then constitutionally required to provide legislative oversight to these audits.
• The very same individuals who are paid to provide legislative oversight of the annual audit are on the payroll of the executive they oversee. Who do they serve first?

Is this not recurring insanity? Who is to make sure that all the parts work to make the annual audit happens? It is clear that a core aspect of mitigating audit reporting failures is fixing the systemic misfit inherited in 1981 and made worse since. It’s a perfect example of unfinished decolonisation and continuing with a system that conflicts with our contextual realities. And the ‘audit problem’ is only one of many visible symptoms of this particular fusion dilemma.

Forty-three years after independence, we know that the National Assembly functions largely as a rubber stamp for the Executive – the Prime Minister and the Cabinet always win.  Elected representatives have less interest in being legislators and policy makers than they have in being ministers or ministers of state. The already weak political practice of having backbenchers in the House has become a farce. This fusion of power promotes even more centralisation of executive power – for example, abolishing the post of permanent secretaries (2001). The fusion also facilitates political corruption and political clientelism. And think about this, if legislative oversight of the executive fails at this very apex of state power, how can we demand accountability from the public service and the wider society?

The central point is that we have a systems problem! Post-independence experience also tells us that symptoms of democratic back sliding, such as lack of annual audit reporting, may get a legal band-aid or two here and there. But if the core systemic problems are not addressed, we will just be spinning our collective wheels and listening to the noise of the partisan blame game forever. Sure, there is need for more money, more human resources, more capacity, strengthening of laws, behavioural change, less impunity, and so on. But all these will have little chance of success without core systemic fixes.

Resolving the ‘Cal Dilemma’

In another of my recent TIME COME articles, I argue that a new decolonised constitution, by and for the people, must include radical reforms around at least seven systemic issues:

1. Expand fundamental rights and freedoms with a focus on social democracy.
2. Make Executive power more decentralized and accountable.
3. Reform the electoral system to include proportional representation to better reflect the voices and faces of the people.
4. Enhance people’s participation in decision-making at all levels between elections.
5. Regulate the influence of money in politics and punish public corruption.
6. Enhance the quality of public policy development and implementation.
7. Ensure that the branches of government exercise their powers independently of each other.

If we agree that keeping the status quo is not an option, how do we resolve the latter: the Cal Dilemma? As you know, I make the case for the appointment of all ministers and ministers of state from outside the legislature. This is not a panacea but is a huge part of what is needed. There is, of course, the compromise to have a mixed system of appointment where some ministers come from the legislature, but the majority come from outside it. But this still does not avoid having some of the same persons, in effect, overseeing themselves. They are not beyond rusting up the wheels of audit reporting.

We can be absolutely sure that the political elite of both major political parties, will act to secure the status quo that clearly benefits them. Neither will act independently to give up the extreme centralisation of power and partisan advantages that the lack of separation of powers afford. That’s realpolitik. It means that systemic reforms have to be demanded by people through sustained revolutionary action. This is never easy. But try we must!

I urge the PSU to do more to help lead the change. Part of this is political education. Part of this is helping to organise others. Part of this is to unionise more workers. Part of this is informed and sustained advocacy. It’s time again for civil society, for unions, for the PSU – for all of us – to be a part of building more lasting legacies of systemic reform. If nothing else, this sad saga of the audit problem is a bright red flag telling us that if we do not deal with systemic failures, such as the fusion of executive and legislative powers, things will fall apart. Again. And again.

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